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INTRODUCTION
HEALTH CARE REFORM would greatly benefit the patient-physician relationship. With universal or near-universal cov-
erage, many millions more patients would establish relation-
ships with primary care physicians. As a result, these patients
would have better access to preventive health measures. There
also would be earlier detection of diseases like hypertension, di-
abetes, and cancer so that treatment could be instituted earlier
with greater effectiveness and at a lower cost.
Nevertheless, health care reform also would pose impor-
tant concerns for the patient-physician relationship. This Arti-
cle will focus on these concerns. In Part I, the risk of greater
discontinuities in the patient-physician relationship will be re-
viewed. With health care reform, patients' primary relation-
ships might be with their health care insurers rather than their
physicians, making it more difficult for patients to maintain
long-standing relationships with their physicians.
In Part II, threats to the traditional dedication of physi-
cians to the needs of their patients are discussed. Health care
reform would likely increase two of the conflicts of interest that
physicians face with regard to their fiduciary duty of loyalty to
their patients. Reform would accentuate the conflict between
an individual patient's needs and the needs of other patients. It
also would accentuate the conflict between patient needs and
the physician's personal financial interests.
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I. DISCONTINUITIES IN THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN
RELATIONSHIP
Before discussing how health care reform increases the
likelihood of discontinuities in the patient-physician relation-
ship, it is important to consider the reasons for concern from
such discontinuities.
A. The Importance of Continuity in the Patient-Physician
Relationship
Continuity in the patient-physician relationship has long
been considered a hallmark of high quality medical care. Ac-
cording to the American Medical Association's Code of Medi-
cal Ethics, "[t]he patient has the right to continuity of health
care."1 There are a number of benefits from long-standing pa-
tient-physician relationships. If physicians know their patients
well, they can better evaluate the significance of the patients'
symptoms when the patients seek medical care.2 People react
differently to illness; some are stoic, others are more sensitive to
pain or discomfort. In addition, when a physician interprets a
patient's problems, the physician's judgment will depend in
part on the patient's medical history. Chest discomfort in some-
one with previous heart disease must be viewed differently from
chest discomfort in someone who has a history of heartburn.
Finally, with long-standing relationships, patients are more
likely to trust their physicians and feel comfortable seeking
care. As a result, patients are more likely to consult their phy-
sician early in the course of an illness, before the illness be-
comes difficult to treat. Indeed, studies have shown that con-
tinuity of care leads to greater satisfaction by patients with
their medical care and increases the likelihood that they will
follow their medication regimens and keep their appointments
with physicians.8
1. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION.
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, at xxxiv (1994)
[hereinafter AMA CODE OF ETHICS] (emphasis added).
2. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Allan S. Brett, Managed Competition and the Patient-
Physician Relationship, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 879, 880 (1993) (discussing the important
role of long-term interaction between patients and physicians to convey important individ-
ual nuances).
3. Allen J. Dietrich & Keith I. Marton, Does Continuous Care from a Physician
Make a Difference?, 15 J. FAM. PRAC. 929, 931 (1982); Gregory L. Weiss & Cornelia A.
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There are gains in efficiency as well as quality from long-
standing patient-physician relationships. For example, when
patients change physicians, the new physician will have to un-
dertake a full, initial medical history and physical examination
to gain first-hand knowledge about the patient. While the pa-
tient's medical record4 will include another physician's descrip-
tion of a complete initial evaluation, relying on a second-hand
account of the patient's medical history cannot provide as full
an understanding of the patient to the physician. The patient
may not only have to undergo a duplicative evaluation by the
new physician, there also may be duplication of laboratory and
other tests. The new physician will often experience delays in
obtaining copies of the patient's medical record. Sometimes
parts of the record will be in other cities; sometimes, they will
be located in hospital records departments that are so backlog-
ged with requests for copies that it takes days to weeks before
they can fulfill a new request for copies. Consequently, the new
physician may have to repeat blood tests, x-rays, and other di-
agnostic procedures to complete the initial evaluation of the
patient.
B. The Threat to Continuity from Health Care Reform
Health care reform threatens continuity in the patient-
physician relationship because it is driving the U.S. health care
system more toward insurance provided by prepaid, compre-
hensive health plans like health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and away from insurance provided by traditional, fee-
for-service plans like Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 5 In doing so, re-
Ramsey, Regular Source of Primary Medical Care and Patient Satisfaction, 15 QUALITY
REv. BULL. 180, 181 (1989). To be sure, patients may benefit when they change physi-
cians. A new physician may bring a different perspective to a chronic problem and recog-
nize solutions that were overlooked by the previous physician.
4. The medical record refers to a compilation of notes made by treating physicians,
nurses, and other health care providers, and laboratory test results, x-ray reports, and other
written documentation of a patient's medical care.
5. This trend towards care provided by HMOs has been happening even without
major health care reform legislation, although perhaps as a response to the assumption that
health care reform legislation is in the offing. According to one expert's recent estimate,
total membership in HMOs will probably increase by 10% in 1994 over 1993. In addition,
membership could include as much as 45% of the privately insured population by the year
2000, compared to 26% in 1993. George Anders & Hilary Stout, Dose of Reform: With
Congress Stalled, Health Care Is Shaped by the Private Sector, WALL ST. J, Aug. 26,
1994, at Al.
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form is eliminating the independence of the patient's choice of
physician from the patient's choice of insurance. With a tradi-
tional fee-for-service plan, the costs of care are covered no mat-
ter which physicians the patients see. With an HMO, the costs
of care are covered only when the patients see one of the physi-
cians whom the HMO employs or contracts with to provide ser-
vices to the HMO's subscribers." Consequently, when patients
choose their HMOs, the patients are simultaneously choosing
their physicians.
The linkage between patients' choice of an HMO and
their choice of physicians increases the likelihood of discontinu-
ities in the patient-physician relationship for several reasons.
First, when patients initially choose to receive care from an
HMO, they may find that some or none of their current physi-
cians are on the HMO's panel. Consequently, patients may
have to sever existing relationships with their physicians and
receive their care from different physicians. Second, if patients
become dissatisfied with their HMO and decide to switch to a
different HMO, they also will have to switch to the new
HMO's panel of physicians. Third, patients may be satisfied
with their choice of HMO and the physicians from whom they
receive care but find that one or more of their physicians trans-
fer to a competing HMO. The patients then must choose be-
tween following the physician(s) who move(s) or staying with
the physician(s) who remain(s) with their current HMO.
Fourth, patients may receive their health care as a benefit of
employment and find that their employers no longer offer the
current HMO as an option.8 To retain the employers' contribu-
6. In some HMOs, if patients see a physician outside the HMO, the HMO will pro-
vide coverage but will cover a smaller percentage of the physician's fees than when patients
see a physician within the HMO. In emergency settings when it is not possible to receive
care from HMO physicians, the plan also will cover the costs of care received from non-
HMO physicians.
Although HMOs limit the physicians whose services will be covered, they typically
cover more of the costs of physician services than do traditional fee-for-service plans. While
fee-for-service plans might require patients to pay a copayment of 20% of the costs of
physician services, HMOs might require no copayment or a copayment of $10.00, no mat-
ter how high the cost of physician visits.
7. If patients become dissatisfied with the HMO because of the care provided by the
physicians, then the discontinuities in care are appropriate. However, patients may be
happy with the care received from physicians but dissatisfied with other aspects of the
HMO's operations. For example, patients may dislike a requirement that they be seen by a
nurse initially and by a physician only upon referral by the nurse.
8. Emanuel & Brett, supra note 2, at 880.
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tion to the cost of the health insurance, patients may have to
switch to other insurance plans.
In sum, to the extent that health care reform results in a
shift in health insurance from fee-for-service plans to prepaid,
comprehensive care plans, patients are more likely to find that
they are unable to maintain long-standing relationships with
their physicians. As a result, they will be unable to realize the
benefits from such relationships.
C. Responding to the Risk of Discontinuities
How should society respond to the risk of greater disconti-
nuities in patient-physician relationships from the shift toward
prepaid, comprehensive health care plans? While some consider
this risk an important argument in favor of a Canadian-style
health care system in which patients are free to seek care from
any physician and the government reimburses the physician for
the care provided,9 the concern about discontinuities in the pa-
tient-physician relationship cannot alone settle the debate be-
tween managed competition and single-payer care given all of
the other advantages and disadvantages of managed competi-
tion and single-payer systems. There are many ways within a
system of HMO-style care in which discontinuities can be lim-
ited. For example, many HMOs allow patients to seek care
from physicians outside of their panel as long as the patient
pays a somewhat higher copayment for the outside physician
services. Under such a system, patients could maintain some
independence between their choice of insurers and their choice
of physicians.
II. DIVISION OF THE PHYSICIAN'S FIDUCIARY
DUTY OF LOYALTY
Health care reform also poses a serious threat to the physi-
cian's fiduciary duty of loyalty to the needs of patients. Again,
before analyzing the threat from health care reform, it is im-
portant to consider the physician's duty of loyalty.
9. Id. at 881.
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A. The Importance of the Physician's Duty of Loyalty
Traditionally, the patient-physician relationship has been
viewed as a fiduciary relationship in which the physician owes
the patient a fundamental duty to place the patient's interests
first, above not only the physician's personal interests but also
the interests of other patients. 10 This duty of loyalty arises pri-
marily from the unequal relationship between patients and
physicians.
Physicians are expected to place the interests of their pa-
tients foremost because they possess an inherent power over
their patients. When suffering from an illness, people are in a
most vulnerable state, both physically and psychologically.
Sickness immediately interferes with physical activity and
makes people feel apprehensive about their future. They worry
that they might lose their ability to continue their careers, en-
joy relationships with their family and friends, or pursue de-
sired leisure activities.
Not only are patients unusually vulnerable, they are also
unusually dependent. Patients not only lack medical knowledge,
but, once disabled by illness, they also may be unable to under-
take the research efforts necessary to educate themselves about
their medical conditions. Several decisions may have to be
made before the patients could gain sufficient understanding
about their illnesses. Patients must ultimately rely on their phy-
sicians' judgment when their health, and indeed their life, may
rest in the balance. In order for patients to rely so heavily on
their physicians when they are most vulnerable, patients must
be able to trust deeply in their physicians' dedication to their
interests. Such deep trust would not be possible without assur-
ances from the physicians that patients will not have their in-
terests sacrificed in favor of the interests of their physicians or
of other patients.
For generations, physicians have earned the trust of their
patients by professing to place patient welfare before all other
concerns. This tradition of elevating patient interests above
other interests has endured through the ages as a guiding tenet
10. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 23, 25 (1986) (discussing the origins and
history of the ethical duty of physicians to act on behalf of patients).
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of medical practice." The willingness of patients to turn to
physicians for care, to speak openly about intimate and poten-
tially embarrassing information, and to rely on their physicians'
recommendations depends in large part on the ability of pa-
tients to trust that physicians are acting primarily to advance
the interests of their patients.
The duty of loyalty underlies a wide range of ethical obli-
gations of physicians. Physicians must maintain the confidenti-
ality of their patients' disclosures, 2 care for patients who are
too poor to pay for their care,'3 and care for the sick even when
doing so exposes them to personal health risks.' 4
To be sure, there have always been conflicts of interest
that divide physicians' loyalty to patients. Fee-for-service
medicine encourages physicians to order unnecessary tests or
perform unnecessary operations that not only may cause eco-
nomic harm to their patients, but also may cause physical harm
if complications ensue.' 5 Similarly, when physicians assume re-
sponsibility for the care of multiple patients, they often may
find that more than one patient requires attention at a given
time. As a result, physicians may delay attending to one patient
while providing care to another patient. Nevertheless, these
conflicts have not seriously undermined patient trust in physi-
cians. Indeed, surveys by the Gallup poll taken over the past
fifteen years have consistently found that the public has greater
trust in physicians than almost all other professionals.' 6
B. The Threat to Physician Loyalty from Health Care
Reform
While conflicts of interest that divide the physician's duty
of loyalty are not new, they are likely to be accentuated under
11. Id. at 24-26.
12. AMA CODE OF ETHIcS, supra note 1, at § 5.05.
13. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Caring
for the Poor, 269 JAMA 2533, 2537 (1993) (recommending guidelines for meeting indi-
gent care obligations).
14. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical
Issues in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 JAMA 1360, 1361 (1988) (stating that physicians
may not ethically discriminate against patients based on HIV-positive status).
15. For example, during unnecessary surgery, the patient may die because of the
anesthesiologist's negligent administration of anesthetic drugs.
16. Leslie McAneny, Honesty and Ethics Poll: Pharmacists Retain Wide Lead as
Most Honorable Profession, L.A. TIMES SYNDICATE, July 29, 1993, available in Gallup
Poll News Service.
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health care reform. Health care costs have risen dramatically
over the past three decades; they now consume nearly 14% of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).17 The need to restrain
health care costs will place greater pressure on physicians to
conserve resources when treating their patients, so that suffi-
cient resources will be available to provide care for other pa-
tients. 8 The physician's duty of loyalty to patients will be di-
vided into a dual loyalty to patient and to society. In addition,
as measures are being adopted to make physicians more con-
scious of costs, the dual loyalty is being converted into a triple
loyalty; there is an increasing conflict between the personal fi-
nancial interests of physicians and the needs of patients. For
example, managed care plans typically pay physicians bonuses
for keeping their spending on patient care low. 19 Accordingly,
by withholding potentially beneficial care from their patients,
not only can physicians preserve scarce health care resources,
but they also can increase their income.
1. Balancing the Needs of Individual Patients with the Needs
of Other Patients
Specific aspects of health care reform will increasingly di-
vide the physician's duty of loyalty, requiring physicians to bal-
ance the needs of individual patients with those of other pa-
tients and the needs of society. As efforts intensify to contain
health care costs, there necessarily will be coverage for fewer
medical services.2 0 Even if wasted health care spending could
be eliminated, it still would not be possible to fund all useful
medical care. 1 Some treatments will provide so little benefit
17. TIMOTHY J. HAUSER & JAMES D. JAMESON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. IN-
DUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, 1993, at 42-1 (1993).
18. Competition for resources will come not only from the health care needs of other
patients but also from the need to fund other social goods. David M. Eddy, Health System
Reform: Will Controlling Costs Require Rationing Services?, 272 JAMA 324, 324 (1994).
Currently, there are pressing demands for funds to improve education and housing and to
reduce crime.
19. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 275-81
(1989); Allan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers' Views on Financial Incentives and Qual-
ity, HEALTH AFr., Winter 1991, at 207, 210-11 (examining the use of specific financial
incentives among HMOs).
20. Eddy, supra note 18, at 328.
21. Id. See also Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on Cost Contain-
ment, 269 JAMA 631, 631 (1993) (discussing the cost impact of medical care with a low
cost-benefit).
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that their benefit will not justify their cost; other treatments
will be so costly that their benefit also will not justify their cost.
Accordingly, society needs to devise some methods for choosing
when treatment will be covered and when it will not be
covered.
Consider the following examples. When a patient suffers a
heart attack, physicians could treat the patient with either tis-
sue plasminogen activator (t-PA) or streptokinase to dissolve
the blood clot that caused the heart attack, thereby increasing
the patient's chance of surviving. T-PA costs $2000 more per
patient than streptokinase, but it may lower the risk of death
by an additional 1 % beyond the diminution in risk achieved by
using streptokinase.2 Is the 1 % increase in survival worth
$2000 in additional costs?23
Similarly, when performing certain x-rays, CT scans, and
other radiologic studies, physicians can use low osmolar con-
trast media24 rather than high osmolar contrast media, thereby
reducing the risk to patients since the low osmolar media cause
fewer adverse reactions.2 5 Should the low osmolar media be
used even though they are many times more expensive than the
high osmolar media?
Coronary artery bypass surgery also raises difficult cost-
benefit questions. How much extra benefit over non-surgical
22. According to a recent study, the death rate for patients treated with streptoki-
nase was 7.3%; with t-PA, the death rate was 6.3%. The GUSTO Investigators, An Inter-
national Randomized Trial Comparing Four Thrombolytic Strategies for Acute Myocar-
dial Infarction, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 676-79 (1993); Valentin Fuster, Coronary
Thrombolysis - A Perspective for the Practicing Physician, 329 NEw ENG J MED 723,
723 (1993).
23. If $2000 buys a one percent increase in survival, then $200,000 presumably buys
an additional life. In fact, it is not quite that straightforward. Other studies have not found
any difference in survival between the two drugs, Fuster, supra note 22, at 723, so there is
some question whether the I % difference between t-PA and streptokinase is a real differ-
ence. I am indebted to Professor Baruch A. Brady, Baylor College of Medicine, for this
example.
24. Contrast media are liquid solutions that are given to a patient before certain
kinds of x-rays, CT scans, or other radiologic studies so that the area being studied shows
up more clearly on the x-ray or scan. The osmolarity of a medium refers to the extent to
which solid substances are dissolved in the liquid solution. For example, if one tablespoon
of salt is dissolved in one bottle of water and a teaspoon of salt is dissolved in another
bottle of the same size, the first bottle will have a higher osmolarity.
25. Hitoshi Katayama et al., Adverse Reactions to Ionic and Nonionic Contrast Me-
dia: A Report from the Japanese Committee on the Safety of Contrast Media, 175 RADI-
OLOGY 621, 622 (1990). While the low osmolar media cause fewer non-fatal adverse reac-
tions, there is no difference between the two contrast media in the risk that the patient will
die from their use. Id.
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treatment must we obtain from coronary artery bypass surgery
to justify the higher cost? Is a year without chest pain suffi-
cient benefit, or must there be at least one year longer survival?
Would a two-year or even five-year longer survival be a suffi-
cient benefit? How likely must it be that the extra benefit will
be realized? Should there be a certainty of 10, 25, or 50%?
These kinds of questions are prevalent and must be answered
by society when it chooses how to allocate its limited health
care resources.
During the health care debate in 1993-94, the legislative
proposals for reform provided little guidance for resolving these
questions. For example, among the reform proposals, the Clin-
ton plan arguably provided the most detailed definition of cov-
ered benefits. The Clinton plan expressly included coverage for
childhood vaccinations," and limited coverage for mental
health treatment to thirty days per episode of inpatient care 27
and thirty visits per year for outpatient care.28 However, for the
most part, the bill did not address the rationing decisions that
will have to be made. The bill offered comprehensive hospital
and physician services,29 subject to only a few exclusions, 0 and
when the bill excluded care that is not medically necessary, it
did so without indicating how it would be decided whether a
particular treatment for a particular patient is or is not medi-
cally necessary.31
Rationing decisions could be made by the individual
health care plans. Currently, for example, health care insurers
make decisions about the extent to which they will cover exper-
imental treatments like bone marrow transplantation for meta-
static breast cancer.32 However, these organizations, like the
Clinton plan itself, could fail to address the bulk of rationing
26. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ ll14(b)(1), (c)(l), (d)(1) (1993).
27. Id. § 1115(c)(2)(C).
28. Id. § 1115(e)(2)(C).
29. Id. § 1101.
30. Id. § 101(b).
31. See id. § 1141(a). The bill excluded care "that is not medically necessary or
appropriate" or "that the National Health Board may determine is not medically necessary
or appropriate." Id. The National Health Board would have been authorized to establish
regulatory standards regarding medical necessity. Id. § 1154.
32. William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance Com-
panies of Coverage for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330
NEw ENG. J. MED. 473, 474 (1994) (reporting a 77% approval rate for coverage of high-
dose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplants).
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decisions, leaving the decisions by default to individual physi-
cians. Physicians may be given the instruction to provide care
only when it is medically necessary and then be expected to
determine when care actually is medically necessary. When
treating patients, physicians would have to consider whether
additional treatment would provide sufficient benefit or whether
the resources should be conserved for other patients.
Even if the government and health plans take an active
role in resolving allocation questions, there will still be a good
deal of decision making left for physicians. It will take some
time to assess the value of a particular treatment and decide
whether it should be covered. It took Oregon several years and
millions of dollars to develop its rationing plan for Medicaid
benefits, and even that rationing plan, despite its complexity,
leaves many questions unanswered.33 While rationing guide-
lines are being developed, physicians will have to make ration-
ing decisions without guidance from other potential deci-
sionmakers. In addition, it simply is not possible to establish
guidelines for all of the judgments that are required. The ap-
propriateness of a particular test or treatment depends on the
balancing of a number of factors, including the likelihood of
benefit, degree of benefit,3 4 duration of benefit,35 and cost, 8
and there is no formula that can tell physicians how to weigh a
low likelihood of benefit against a high degree or duration of
benefit. Finally, even if detailed guidelines could be developed,
33. While the plan indicates whether treatment will be covered once a diagnosis is
made, it does not indicate when diagnostic tests should be pursued. See Robert Steinbrook
& Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project. Will It Provide Adequate
Medical Care?, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 340, 342 (1992) (discussing the problems that
such ambiguities create for attending physicians). Nor does it in most cases indicate how to
choose among the different medical therapies available. For example, Oregon covers 565
different health care services, see Michael Janofsky, Oregon Starts to Extend Health Care,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1994, at 6, including medical treatment for a heart attack. See ORE-
GON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N. PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERvIcEs: A REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE app., line 258 (1993). However, Oregon does not specify
whether medical treatment for a heart attack should include streptokinase or t-PA. Id. See
also supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (discussing the choice between streptokinase and
t-PA for a heart attack as an important rationing decision).
34. Degree of benefit refers to the extent to which the patient's health is improved by
receiving treatment.
35. Duration of benefit reflects the length of time over which a treatment's benefit
lasts. Some medical treatments, like an appendectomy, confer a permanent benefit; other
treatments, like cancer chemotherapy, provide only a temporary benefit.
36. David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 271
JAMA 308, 312 (1994).
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they would likely become outdated by the time they were is-
sued. Medical knowledge is constantly evolving, so only reason-
ably general guidelines can account for changes in information
and technology. While the government and the medical spe-
cialty societies are issuing many practice guidelines for physi-
cians, the guidelines will never be able to address the universe
of rationing decisions that must be made,3 7 and society will
have no choice but to leave many of these decisions to
physicians.
Some have argued that physicians should make rationing
decisions not simply because there is no other choice but be-
cause doctors are the appropriate decisionmakers. For example,
E. Haavi Morreim argues that, if persons other than physicians
make these decisions, then they will in effect be practicing
medicine without a license, and physicians will not be practic-
ing medicine, but will be carrying out medical decisions made
by laypersons. 8 While Morreim is correct that physicians
should be making these decisions, it is not because these are
medical decisions that can be decided simply by applying medi-
cal expertise. Rather, rationing decisions are ultimately value
judgments about balancing benefits against costs and deciding
when there is sufficient benefit to justify the use of society's
limited health care resources. These are judgments that layper-
sons are as qualified as physicians to make.
Consider the following example that illustrates how medi-
cal judgments are no different in kind from other value judg-
ments. As a general rule, obstetricians offer amniocentesis to
check for Down syndrome in pregnant women without a family
history of Down syndrome only if the women are at least
thirty-five years old.39 This general rule reflects, in part, the
fact that, when the woman is age thirty-five or over, the risk
37. According to a recent report, the federal government's practice guidelines have
had little effect in changing physicians' practices, in part because they are often too vague
to give adequate guidance in specific situations. See Joe R. Neel, Guidelines Go Unheeded:
A Government Effort to Change Doctors' Behavior Draws Apathy Instead, PHYSICIAN'S
WKLY., Aug. 22, 1994, at 13 (discussing the lack of patient outcomes and targets in guide-
lines issued by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research).
38. E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 61 (1991) (discussing challenges to the clinical authority of
physicians by non-medical personnel).
39. Joe Leigh Simpson, Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis, in OBSTETRICS:
NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 269, 278 (Steven G. Gabbe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
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that the fetus will suffer from Down syndrome is equal to or
greater than the risk that the amniocentesis will inadvertently
abort the fetus.40 In other words, the medical community has
concluded that women should be offered amniocentesis only
when the likelihood of detecting a Down syndrome fetus equals
or exceeds the risk of aborting a normal fetus. This conclusion
may be a reasonable balance to draw between the benefits and
risks of an amniocentesis, but it is also the case that many
women may have very strong feelings about not having a Down
syndrome child and may therefore want to undergo amni-
ocentesis unless the risk of an abortion is five, ten, or even
twenty times that of the risk of a Down syndrome fetus. These
women might reason that they can always try to become preg-
nant again, but they cannot undo the birth of a child with
Down syndrome. In short, reasonable people can differ on the
appropriate place to draw the balance, and there is nothing
about medical expertise that helps us settle the question.
But if these decisions are ultimately value judgments for
which physicians have no special expertise, then why should
physicians have responsibility for making them? There are very
good reasons why we should prefer not to have physicians make
rationing decisions. First, physicians may overestimate the need
to conserve resources, thereby undertreating some of their pa-
tients, or they may overestimate the benefit from some treat-
ments, thereby overtreating other patients. Physicians cannot
possibly assimilate all of the information needed to make ra-
tioning decisions. They would need to know not only how much
benefit the patient might receive from treatment, how likely it
would be that the benefit be realized, and how much it would
cost for the treatment, but they also would have to know what
other social benefits would be realized if the funds were used
for other patients or other kinds of social services. Second,
there would be a good deal of inconsistency from physician to
physician. Some physicians will err in favor of conserving soci-
ety's limited resources; others will err in favor of treating the
patient before them. Whether patients will be treated, then,
may turn more on their particular physician's views than any
40. Susan P. Pauker & Stephen G. Pauker, Prenatal Diagnosis: Why Is 35 a Magic
Number?, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1151, 1151 (1994) (noting that individual patient risks
and attitudes also should be factored into the testing decision).
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overarching rationing principles.4" Third, if physicians become
responsible for rationing decisions, patients may become in-
creasingly distrustful of their physicians. Patient trust may be
eroded as patients wonder whether they are receiving all neces-
sary treatment or whether their physicians are withholding
some care because of the needs of other patients.
The argument for relying on physicians to make rationing
decisions, then, is not that they are good decisionmakers, but
that there is no better way to make rationing decisions and that
there are important efficiencies in having physicians make these
decisions. As discussed previously, it is not possible for other
members of society to establish rationing guidelines that will
resolve all rationing questions. Accordingly, physicians will fre-
quently be faced with rationing decisions for which there are no
clear answers. In theory, physicians could bring these decisions
to another party, an administrative judge, perhaps, when the
state is providing their patients' health care coverage, or a
claims reviewer, perhaps, when patients subscribe to private in-
surance plan for coverage. However, given the tremendous
number of decisions that must be made, it would be too cum-
bersome to bring each decision to a third party. On the other
hand, if physicians make these decisions, it will be administra-
tively very efficient. Physicians will know much of the informa-
tion about the benefits, risks, and costs of treatment that is rel-
evant to making the rationing decisions that are before them.
Because of the concerns about physician decision making,
it is important that society issue rationing guidelines that are as
specific as possible to lead physicians in the right direction. It is
also essential to adopt safeguards to prevent physicians from
41. Even before rationing became a serious concern, physicians varied widely in their
use of certain procedures. One study demonstrated that patients in Boston were much more
likely than similar patients in New Haven to be hospitalized. John E. Wennberg et al., Are
Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-utilised in Boston?, LANCET, May 23,
1987, at 1185. Another study found that some physicians at one hospital were twice as
likely as their colleagues to perform cesarean sections, even after controlling for differences
among the patients. See Gregory L. Goyert et al., The Physician Factor in Cesarean Birth
Rates, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 706, 708 (1989). See also David Blumenthal, The Varia-
tion Phenomenon in 1994, 331 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1017, 1017-18 (1994) (discussing differ-
ences in the treatment received by similar patients in different places); David Orentlicher,
The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2101-03 (1992)
(discussing the primacy of physician values over patient preferences in decisions to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment).
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deviating from the spirit of those guidelines when they are ap-
plying them to decisions not clearly settled by the guidelines.
A number of unsatisfactory approaches have been sug-
gested to guide physicians. E. Haavi Morreim has proposed
that physicians test their proposed action by its general-
izability. Morreim argues that, when physicians are considering
a particular test or treatment and they are concerned about its
affordability, they should ask themselves whether the patient's
health care plan could afford to have physicians provide the
proposed test or treatment every time the same situation
arose. While Morreim articulates an excellent principle, it
does not provide specific enough guidance for physicians. As
already discussed, one of the major objections to physician de-
cision making is the fact that each physician will draw the bal-
ance among different patients' needs differently, depending on
the physician's own values and assessments of what the system
can afford. Morreim's approach does not adequately address
that problem.
Susan Wolf has suggested a sliding scale approach, with
greater obligations to provide treatment when harm can be pre-
vented than when benefit can be conferred. Specifically, Wolf
argues that physicians have (a) the "strongest duty" to provide
treatment when the treatment is likely to prevent "great harm"
to the patient, (b) a "strong duty" to provide treatment when
the treatment is likely to prevent "some harm," (c) a "duty" to
provide treatment when the treatment is likely to confer "great
benefit," and (d) a "weak duty" to provide treatment when
treatment is likely to confer "some benefit. 43 Wolf's basic
point is an important one; the greater the need for treatment,
the greater the obligation to provide it. Yet, her guidelines, too,
lack sufficient specificity.
What will physicians do when faced with a situation for
which there is a "weak duty" to provide care? Does this duty
entail a presumption that the treatment should be provided but
that the presumption should be overridden if there are counter-
vailing circumstances? Which countervailing circumstances
would count? Would the obligation to treat turn on the current
42. MORREIM, supra note 38, at 128.
43. Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28, 35-36.
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balance sheet of the health plan or on whether there are other
patients with more compelling needs vying for the physician's
time?
Wolf's proposal also has some theoretical problems when it
distinguishes preventing harm from conferring benefit. Why
should there be the strongest duty to prevent great harm but
only a simple duty to confer great benefit? What exactly is the
distinction between preventing harm and conferring benefit? If
a physician lowers a patient's risk of dying, is that preventing
harm (avoiding death) or conferring benefit (prolonging life)?
2. Financial Incentives to Encourage Cost-Conscious
Practices by Physicians
Recent legislative proposals have not informed us how
physicians would be guided, but we can easily deduce how they
would be guided from the emphasis on having health care pro-
vided by HMOs and other managed care plans. Managed care
plans rely heavily on personal financial incentives for physicians
to encourage greater cost consciousness among physicians when
making treatment decisions." For example, the plans often
compensate physicians with capitation fees or a salary. With a
capitation fee, since the physicians earn a fixed amount of
money per patient, physicians cannot increase their income by
providing more services to their patients, as with fee-for-service
care. 45 Similarly, physicians paid by salary have no financial
incentive to provide more services. Rather, when their income
is fixed by capitation or salary, physicians have an incentive to
provide fewer services and free up more time for leisure or
other activities.
In addition to incentives for physicians to limit their own
services, managed care plans typically employ incentives for
physicians to limit their use of diagnostic tests, referrals to
other physicians, hospital care, or other ancillary services.4 6 For
44. See generally Hillman et al., supra note 19, at 207 (examining the use of specific
financial incentives among HMOs).
45. However, physicians can increase their income by assuming responsibility for the
care of greater numbers of patients.
46. These incentives are needed to discourage physicians from circumventing cost
controls by substituting ancillary services for their own services. If cost controls make it
more difficult for physicians to provide additional care, physicians otherwise could avoid
the cost controls by referring the patient to other physicians for care.
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example, managed care plans often pay bonuses to physicians,
with the amount of the bonus increasing as the plans' expendi-
tures for patient care decrease. Managed care plans often with-
hold a fixed percentage of physician compensation until the end
of the year to cover any shortfalls in the funds budgeted for
expenditures on patient care. If there is no shortfall, or the
shortfall can be covered by part of the withheld fees, the re-
maining withheld fees are returned to the physicians.
Financial incentives may be common,47 but they are never-
theless controversial. They not only impel physicians to balance
the needs of their patients with the needs of other patients, they
also accentuate the conflict between patient needs and the per-
sonal financial interests of physicians. In other words, there is
not only a dual loyalty but a triple loyalty.
The concerns with incentives to limit care are significant.
Physicians may be tempted to cut corners or start viewing as
elective those treatments that were previously considered neces-
sary.48 Physicians also might delay or omit diagnostic tests or
therapeutic procedures, or they might assume responsibility for
care that should be referred to more expert and more expensive
specialists. 49 Even in the absence of actual physical harm to
patients, incentives to limit care may compromise the trust that
patients place in their physicians. If patients realize that their
physicians are being pressured with financial rewards to econo-
mize on care, then patients will likely wonder whether treat-
ment is being withheld because it is unnecessary or because
their physicians have financial reasons to withhold the care. For
example, patients with heart disease treated by drugs rather
than surgery may start to worry that they are being denied sur-
gery because of their physicians' personal financial interests.
Financial incentives to withhold services are also problem-
atic because their effects may not be apparent to patients.
When physicians recommend an invasive diagnostic test, sur-
gery, or some other course of action, patients may choose to
seek a second opinion before undertaking the risks and costs of
the action. However, when physicians do not offer an interven-
tion, patients may have no idea that a diagnostic or treatment
47. In one study, more than half of HMOs used fee withholds as an incentive for
their physicians to limit care. Hillman et al., supra note 19, at 211.
48. Pellegrino, supra note 10, at 31.
49. Id.
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option was withheld and therefore not realize that a second
opinion might be appropriate. 50
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why incentives to
limit care may not compromise the quality of medical care.
First, while physicians are motivated by financial concerns, 51
they also are strongly devoted to other values and goals, in par-
ticular, to enhancing the health of their patients. Physicians
clearly seek financial gain, but it is not clear that they would
sacrifice the welfare of their patients to do so.
Second, the threat of malpractice liability provides a
strong deterrent to the withholding of necessary care. Physi-
cians already are prone to practice defensive medicine-their
perception of the risk of a malpractice lawsuit is up to three
times the actual risk of suit.52 Hospitals and health care plans
are also at risk from physician malpractice and therefore have
strong incentives to monitor quality of care and ensure that ap-
propriate care is not withheld by physicians.
Third, it is possible that financial incentives to limit care
will lead to care with fewer complications and more efficient
utilization of health care resources. For example, because de-
lays in intervention can allow a disease to develop or progress
and become more costly to treat, incentives to limit care may
actually result in more aggressive efforts to ensure that patients
receive preventive and therapeutic services as early as possible.
If physicians are penalized for high health care costs, they are
more likely to try to prevent high costs from materializing. In-
deed, many early proponents of HMOs encouraged their use
because of their emphasis on preventive care, not simply as a
means to contain health care costs. Studies have shown that
HMO patients receive more preventive tests and examinations
than patients who subscribe to traditional fee-for-service plans
for their health care coverage. 53
50. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment: Challenging Fidelity and Justice, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988, at 20, 21.
51. Future income plays an important role when medical students choose their fields
of specialization. See Norman G. Levinsky, Recruiting for Primary Care, 328 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 656, 658 (1993).
52. Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 463, 468-69 (1992) (reporting results by physician specialty).
53. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994).
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While there are theoretical arguments both in support of
and in opposition to the claim that incentives to limit care will
compromise physician decision making, the experience with in-
centives to expand services suggests that incentives to limit care
will likely influence physician behavior. A number of studies
have indicated that financial incentives to prescribe x-rays,
physical therapy, or other medical services result in increased
use of the services. 4 If incentives to expand services result in
greater use of those services and possibly overtreatment of pa-
tients, 55 then it arguably follows that incentives to limit care
will result in lower use of those services and possibly
undertreatment.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that incentives to
limit services will result in inadequate care. If, as many com-
mentators believe, the harm to patient health is greater when
necessary treatment is withheld than when unnecessary treat-
54. In these studies, the financial incentives took one of the following forms: higher
compensation to the physicians if they provided more services, increased billings by the
physician's offices if more services were provided in the office, or greater return on the
physician investment in a health care facility if the physicians referred more patients to the
facility. See David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives: Evi-
dence from a For-profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED 1059, 1060
(1990) (finding that a compensation plan allowing doctors to earn bonuses depending on
the gross income they generated resulted in more X-ray tests being ordered by these doc-
tors); Bruce J. Hillman et al., Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnos-
tic Imaging in a Medicare Population, 268 JAMA 2050, 2052-53 (1992) (finding that
physicians operating office radiology equipment perform imaging studies more frequently
than physicians that refer to radiologists); Janet M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician
Ownership of Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Ser-
vice Characteristics, 268 JAMA 2055, 2057-58 (1992) (finding that utilization, charges
per patients, and profits are higher when physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities are
owned by referring physicians); Janet M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Consequences
of Physicians' Ownership of Health Care Facilities-Joint Ventures in Radiation Ther-
apy, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1497, 1499-50 (1992) (finding that physician involvement in
radiation therapy centers appeared to increase the use of radiation therapy relative to
Medicare beneficiaries as a whole); Alex Swedlow et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use
in the California Workers' Compensation System as a Result of Self-referral by Physi-
cians, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1502, 1503-04 (1992) (finding that physical therapy was
initiated more often by physicians who own the treatment facility to which they refer
patients).
55. While the studies show a link between financial incentives and use of services,
they have not resolved whether patients receive too much care when the incentives exist,
too little care when the incentives are absent, or somewhere in between. That question may
never be resolvable. Since additional care almost always will confer some benefits at some
risk and people differ in their assessment of the appropriate trade-off between benefits and
risks, it is not clear that we could ever establish the "right" amount of care.
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ment is provided, 6 physicians are less likely to be influenced by
incentives to limit care than by incentives to expand care. With
incentives to limit care, physician concerns with patient welfare
will be a stronger countervailing force. When physicians are
uncertain whether to offer additional tests or treatments, con-
cerns about protecting patient health may overcome the pull
from any incentives to limit care and result in the physicians
offering the extra tests or procedures.
Moreover, the existence of health care insurance makes it
likely that physician practices have been affected more by in-
centives to expand care than they would be by incentives to
limit care. The primary harm from excessive care is financial,
but the current system of health care insurance dilutes the fi-
nancial harm to patients from overuse of services. Since pa-
tients do not pay the full cost of excessive care, they do not
have a strong incentive to ensure that they do not receive un-
necessary care. As a result, physicians and patients may not be
very sensitive to the harm of financial incentives to expand
care. However, if necessary care is withheld, the primary harm
is physical, and patients will feel the harm fully and directly.
Accordingly, physicians and patients are likely to be very sensi-
tive to the potential harm from incentives to limit care.
a. Empirical Studies of Incentives to Limit Care
A number of researchers have tried to examine the impact
on quality of care from the use of financial incentives to limit
care. There are two primary sources of data on the effects of
incentives to limit care. First, studies have compared the health
of patients57 treated under fee-for-service plans with the health
of patients in prepaid health plans that typically employ finan-
cial incentives to limit care. If incentives to limit care result in
patient harm, then these studies should find that patients in
56. When necessary treatment is withheld, a disease may worsen and become less
responsive to later treatment. When unnecessary treatment is provided, patients suffer eco-
nomic harm from the cost of the care. Patients also may be physically injured if one of the
rare complications of the treatment occurs. For example, a patient undergoing unnecessary
surgery may suffer a paralysis because the surgeon inadvertently cuts a nerve.
57. Measuring health is not the same as measuring quality of care. Some patients
will do well even with poor quality care; other patients will do badly even with the best
care. However, since it is more difficult to assess the quality of care than health status,
researchers often look at health status on the assumption that over large numbers of pa-
tients, differences in health status will reflect differences in quality of care.
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prepaid plans have a worsening of health relative to patients in
fee-for-service plans.
Second, studies have compared both the health status and
the quality of care for hospitalized patients under Medicare's
earlier fee-for-service system of reimbursement with the health
status and the quality of care for hospitalized patients under
Medicare's current system of prospective reimbursement in
which hospitals receive a fixed amount of compensation for
each patient.58 If incentives to limit care cause harm to pa-
tients, then the patients should be doing worse from the time
that Medicare changed its system of reimbursement.
i. Prepaid Health Plans. In one study, more than 1500 in-
dividuals were randomly assigned to receive health care either
from an HMO or through a fee-for-service insurance plan. The
HMO had lower costs than the fee-for-service plan, but, on av-
erage, there were no significant differences in health between
individuals in the two plans three years after the study began.5 9
However, for individuals who were sick at the beginning of the
study, different outcomes were found depending upon the indi-
vidual's income. Among those sick patients who were in the top
40% of the income distribution, better health outcomes re-
sulted for individuals in the HMO.60 Conversely, low-income,
sick patients fared better with the fee-for-service system.6' In
another study of chronically mentally ill patients who received
their health coverage through Medicaid, the patients were ran-
domly assigned to either fee-for-service care or prepaid health
care. The researchers found no consistent evidence of harm to
the health status of patients assigned to prepaid plans. On a
few of the measurements used to assess health status, there
58. Medicare now reimburses under a system of capitated reimbursement which pro-
vides an incentive to limit care rather than a system of fee-for-service reimbursement
which provides an incentive to expand care. While the amount of reimbursement is fixed,
there are different reimbursement rates for different diseases, so that hospitals receive
greater reimbursement when the patient has a disease that is expensive to treat. See Medi-
care Prospective Payment System, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988).
59. Elizabeth M. Sloss et al., Effect of a Health Maintenance Organization on Phys-
iologic Health: Results from a Randomized Trial, 106 ANNALS INTERNAL MED 130, 130
(1987) (finding that there were no differences in health status); John E. Ware et al., Com-
parison of Health Outcomes at a Health Maintenance Organisation with Those of Fee-
for-service Care, LANCET, May 3, 1986, at 1017.
60. Ware et al., supra note 59, at 1021.
61. Id.; John E. Ware et al., HEALTH OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN PREPAID AND FEE-
FOR-SERVICE SYSTEMS OF CARE: RESULTS FROM THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT, at
v-vi (Rand Paper No. R-3459-HHS, Oct. 1987).
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were differences between patients in prepaid plans and those
receiving fee-for-service care. However, there was no consistent
pattern, with the fee-for-service patients sometimes doing bet-
ter, other times not doing as well. 2
Other studies have yielded mixed results. In some early
studies of care for obstetric patients or patients with rheuma-
toid arthritis, researchers found no difference in outcome be-
tween patients in prepaid plans and those in fee-for-service
practices.6 3 However, in a recent study of elderly patients with
chest pain or joint pain, researchers found that patients with
joint pain were less likely to report an improvement in their
pain when they received care from an HMO rather than under
a fee-for-service insurance plan.64 In another recent study, on
the other hand, researchers actually found a clear health bene-
fit from prepaid health care. The study looked at patients with
appendicitis, and the researchers found that patients enrolled in
a prepaid health care plan were significantly less likely than
patients receiving fee-for-service care to suffer a rupture of
their appendix before their appendectomy.6 5 In other words, the
fee-for-service patients were more likely to experience a delay
between the development of their symptoms of appendicitis and
the surgery to remove their appendix. The authors of the study
62. Nicole Lurie et al., Does Capitation Affect the Health of the Chronically Men-
tally Ill?: Results from a Randomized Trial, 267 JAMA 3300, 3302 (1992).
63. See Timothy S. Carey et al., Prepaid versus Traditional Medicaid Plans: Lack
of Effect on Pregnancy Outcomes and Prenatal Care, 26 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 165, 172-
75 (1991) (comparing prenatal care and birth outcomes of Medicaid recipients in prepaid
and fee-for-service plans); Jonathan D. Quick et al., Prenatal Care and Pregnancy Out-
come in an HMO and General Population: A Multivariate Cohort Analysis, 71 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 381, 384-88 (1981) (comparing prenatal care and birth outcomes between
HMO enrollees and the general population) Charles H. Wright et al., Obstetric Care in a
Health Maintenance Organization and a Private Fee-for-service Practice: A Comparative
Analysis, 149 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 848, 855 (1984) (comparing pregnancy
outcomes between HMO and fee-for-service patients in the same hospital); Edward H.
Yelin et al., Health Outcomes for a Chronic Disease in Prepaid Group Practice and Fee
for Service Settings: The Case of Rheumatoid Arthritis, 24 MED. CARE 236, 245-46
(1986) (comparing medical outcomes of patients with rheumatoid arthritis in fee-for-ser-
vice and prepaid group practice plans).
64. Dolores G. Clement et al., Access and Outcomes of Elderly Patients Enrolled in
Managed Care, 271 JAMA 1487, 1490 (1994). There were no differences in outcome be-
tween the HMO and fee-for-service patients with chest pain. Id. at 1491.
65. Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured
Appendix, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444, 446-448 (1994) (comparing the adjusted risk of
ruptured appendix according to type of insurance). If a patient with appendicitis suffers a
rupture of the inflamed appendix before it is removed surgically, then the risk of death and
other complications increases significantly.
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speculated that the higher deductibles66 and copayments6 7 in
fee-for-service care may have discouraged the fee-for-service
patients from seeking treatment as rapidly as their prepaid
health care counterparts.68
ii. Medicare's Prospective Payment System. Studies have
also looked at the impact on health status and quality of care
from the implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment
System (PPS) for hospital care. The studies compared Medi-
care patients who were treated before 1984, when Medicare re-
imbursed on a retrospective, fee-for-service basis, with patients
who were treated after 1984, when Medicare started reimburs-
ing on a prospective, fixed capitation basis. Although these
studies involved hospital rather than physician reimbursement,
they are likely to be informative. As hospitals are subjected to
financial pressures to limit care, they will try to transmit those
pressures to physicians because physicians largely control medi-
cal decision making.
Some small studies have shown mixed results from the im-
plementation of Medicare's capitation system. In a study of pa-
tients who were treated in medical intensive care units in three
community hospitals, researchers found no significant changes
in the death rates of Medicare patients up to six months follow-
ing discharge from the hospital.69 On the other hand, a study of
elderly individuals in a single county found adverse effects on
death rates from the implementation of capitated payments.70
Another study of elderly patients with hip fractures found that
66. Fee-for-service insurance plans typically require the patient to pay a certain
amount of health care costs each year, usually between $200 and $500 in an individual
plan and more in a family plan, before the plan begins to pay for the patient's costs. Pre-
paid plans typically have no deductible.
67. Fee-for-service insurance plans generally require patients to pay a portion of
each of their health care bills, often 20%, while prepaid plans typically have no copay-
ments, or copayments of $5-10.
68. Braveman et al., supra note 65, at 448. See also supra text accompanying note
53 (discussing studies which have shown that HMO patients receive more preventive tests
and examinations than patients who subscribe to traditional fee-for-service plans).
69. S. Allison Mayer-Oakes et al., The Early Effect of Medicare's Prospective Pay-
ment System on the Use of Medical Intensive Care Services in Three Community Hospi-
tals, 260 JAMA 3146, 3148 (1988).
70. Gregory L. Lindberg et al., Health Care Cost Containment Measures and Mor-
tality in Hennepin County's Medicaid Elderly and All Elderly, 79 AM. J PuB. HEALTH
1481, 1484-85 (1989) (reporting an increase in age-adjusted mortality rates among nursing
home patients and the cessation of a downward trend in age-adjusted mortality rates
among the elderly that occurred concurrently with the introduction of PPS).
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Medicare patients were more likely to be in a nursing home
one year after their fractures after the change to the capitated
system2 1
Although these small studies indicate that patient welfare
may have suffered from Medicare's adoption of capitated pay-
ments, a large, carefully conducted study has suggested the op-
posite result. In that study, researchers examined the care of
nearly 17,000 patients in five states who were hospitalized for
treatment of congestive heart failure, heart attack, pneumonia,
stroke, or hip fracture.72 The prospective system was intro-
duced in 1984, and the researchers compared patient care in
1981-82 with care in 1985-86. For the patients in 1985-86,
there was no increase in death rates, either during hospitaliza-
tion or six months following admission of the patients to the
hospital,73 and the patients were more likely to receive good
quality care during their hospitalizations. 4 Although patients
were more likely to be unstable medically when discharged
from the hospital,75 that does not mean that there was harm to
their health. It may be that although patients were discharged
earlier under the new system, appropriate outpatient medical
services were provided in lieu of hospital care to complete their
course of treatment.
71. John F. Fitzgerald et al., The Care of Elderly Patients with Hip Fracture:
Changes Since Implementation of the Prospective Payment System, 319 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1392, 1395 (1988) (finding that the rate of nursing home residence one year after
hospitalization increased by 200% after initiation of PPS).
72. Katherine L. Kahn et al., The Effects of the DRG-based Prospective Payment
System on Quality of Care for Hospitalized Medicare Patients: An Introduction to the
Series, 264 JAMA 1953, 1954 (1990) (providing an overview of the study methods).
73. Katherine L. Kahn et al., Comparing Outcomes of Care Before and After Imple-
mentation of the DRG-based Prospective Payment System, 264 JAMA 1984, 1985 (1990)
(reporting similar survival curves before and after implementation of PPS for all five
conditions).
74. Lisa V. Rubenstein et al., Changes in Quality of Care for Five Diseases Mea-
sured by Implicit Review, 1981 to 1986, 264 JAMA 1974, 1977 (1990). The improvement
in quality of care probably reflected factors other than the change in Medicare reimburse-
ment. Joseph P. LoGerfo et al., The Prospective Payment System and Quality: No Skele-
tons in the Closet, 264 JAMA 1995, 1995-96 (1990) (noting that professional ethics and
changes in peer review organizations may serve to protect quality). For example, in the
four-year period, there were the usual improvements in quality of care that occur over
time.
75. Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Dis-
charge: The 'Quicker-and-Sicker' Story Revisited, 264 JAMA 1980, 1982 (1990) (report-
ing a 22% increase after implementation of PPS in the number of Medicare patients dis-
charged unstable).
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While the data on instability need to be further investi-
gated, the studies overall suggest that patient harm has not re-
sulted from the inherent financial incentive for hospitals to
limit care under Medicare's capitated payment system. Still, a
decline in quality of care could have been hidden by manipula-
tion of diagnoses. It may be that implementation of the capi-
tated payment system encouraged physicians or hospital ad-
ministrative staffs to assign more severe diagnoses to patients to
assure higher Medicare reimbursement. 6 If the patients had
worse outcomes from poorer care under the capitated payment
system, it would be erroneously attributed to their more severe
diagnoses rather than to their poorer care. In addition, the im-
pact of capitated payment on quality of care might have been
more detrimental if hospitals were not able to engage in cost-
shifting from Medicare patients to patients with private, fee-
for-service insurance. 7
To date, the available data suggest that, in the aggregate,
incentives to limit care are not significantly compromising pa-
tient care, but that some patients, particularly the poor, may be
adversely affected. However, there are not sufficient empirical
data to draw definitive conclusions about the effect on patient
welfare from incentives to limit care. The studies also are not
rigorous enough to exchide the possibility of undetected harm-
ful consequences. Finally, much of the data was developed in
the early stages of cost containment when there was more fat
to cut out of health care spending and when private insurers
tolerated more cost-shifting. Consequently, while the data may
have reflected the impact of incentives to limit care at one
time, they may no longer be valid.
C. Responding to the Divisions of Loyalty
Given the potential for harm to patient welfare and to the
integrity of the patient-physician relationship, some commenta-
76. AnnLouise R. Assaf et al., Possible Influence of the Prospective Payment Sys-
tem on the Assignment of Discharge Diagnoses for Coronary Heart Disease, 329 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 931, 934-35 (1993) (noting significant changes in discharge coding concur-
rent with the introduction of PPS). Patients with more severe diagnoses need more expen-
sive care so Medicare assigns a higher level of compensation for those diagnoses.
77. Hospitals may have been able to compensate for the reduction in reimbursement
for Medicare patients by increasing their charges for patients covered by private, fee-for-
service insurance plans.
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tors argue that financial incentives to limit care should be pro-
hibited. Other commentators believe that the incentives
should be allowed as long as they are regulated so that physi-
cians are sensitive to costs when making treatment decisions
but are not so concerned about protecting their income that
they would compromise patient welfare.
1. Eliminate Financial Incentives that Have a High Potential
for Abuse
Commentators have identified several characteristics of fi-
nancial incentives that are important indicators of whether
physicians are being given too strong an incentive to limit care.
These characteristics include: (a) the amount of financial risk
borne by the physicians, (b) whether incentives are tied to the
performance of physicians individually or as a group, and (c)
the length of time over which physician performance is
measured.80
a. Amount of Financial Risk Shifted
Health insurers may shift financial risk to physicians in a
number of ways. A percentage of physician fees may be with-
held until the end of the year to cover deficits in the fund for
expenditures on diagnostic tests, referral services, hospital care,
or other ancillary care. Withheld funds can be used to cover a
narrow range of services like diagnostic tests and referrals to
specialists or to cover the full range of ancillary services. As
the breadth of services covered by the withheld funds increases,
the amount of risk shifted to physicians increases. Risk also
may be shifted by varying the fee paid for a particular service
from month to month depending upon the extent to which ser-
vices are utilized. For example, a physician who ordinarily re-
ceives $100 for a service may receive $80 one month, when
utilization of services is high, and $120 in a month when utili-
zation of services is low.81
78. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 43, at 37.
79. See, e.g., PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 19, at 292; Hillman
et al., supra note 19, at 218.
80. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 19, at 287-88; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY PREPAID HEALTH
PLANS COULD LOWER QUALITY OF CARE, GAO/HRD-89-29, at 23 (Dec. 1988).
81. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 17.
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To avoid the shifting of excessive risk to physicians, stop-
loss protections are typically used by managed care plans.82
With stop-loss protections, a physician's financial responsibility
may be limited to a specified amount per patient and/or a spec-
ified amount per year for all patients. The health care plan
would assume responsibility for the costs of care that exceeded
the ceiling amounts. In its proposed rules, the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA) requires that health care
plans place no more than 30 % of a physician's compensation at
risk.83 On the other hand, in a survey of HMO managers, most
managers generally felt that placing 15% of a physician's in-
come at risk is enough to make physicians sensitive to the costs
of care without inducing physicians to make inappropriate
treatment decisions.84
b. Number of Physicians Sharing the Risk
If physician incentive payments are based solely on each
physician's own treatment decisions, there is a strong incentive
to limit services for each patient. Every additional medical ser-
vice will have a direct effect on the physician's income. When
payments are based on the performance of a group of physi-
cians, on the other hand, the strength of the incentive is dimin-
ished. For example, when payments are based on the record of
twenty physicians, a physician will feel only 5 % of the impact
of any one decision rather than its full impact. Consequently,
while the physicians will still recognize that their failure to
economize will reduce their income, they will not face as strong
a conflict between the needs of their patients and their own
financial interests.
Basing the incentives on a group of physicians is useful for
two other reasons. First, when physicians are placed at risk to-
gether, they have a collective incentive to ensure that their col-
leagues are practicing in a cost-effective manner.85 Second, if
incentive payments are based on a large group of physicians,
the payments will necessarily be based on the costs incurred by
82. Id. at 28.
83. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans
in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, 59,032 (1992) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 417, 434, 1003) (proposed Dec. 14, 1992).
84. See Hillman et al., supra note 19, at 212-13.
85. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 19, at 287.
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a large pool of patients. When the patient pool is small, there is
a risk that treatment costs will be skewed by an unrepresenta-
tive group of patients that have unusually high needs for medi-
cal care. The larger the patient pool, the more likely that its
treatment costs will not be skewed but will reflect average
costs.86
c. Length of Time for Measuring Performance
The strength of a financial incentive also varies with the
frequency of incentive payments. If payments are made
monthly rather than yearly, the physician receives rapid feed-
back on the economic consequences of treatment decisions and
is therefore likely to be more sensitive to those consequences.
When incentives are calculated monthly, there also is less of an
opportunity for the costs of cases that are above average to be
offset by the costs of cases that are below average. Accordingly,
there is a stronger incentive not to incur unusually high ex-
penses in any one case.
In its proposed rules, HCFA permits less of a physician's
income to be put at risk if incentive payments are made more
frequently than once a year. If payments are made once a year,
up to 30% of a physician's income may be placed at risk; if
payments are made more frequently than once a year, up to
20% of a physician's income may be placed at risk. 7
2. Eliminate the Incentives Entirely
Limiting the kinds of incentives that can be offered is an
important step; however, some commentators argue that it is
not sufficient just to eliminate only the most dangerous incen-
tives. They observe that there is no objective method for defin-
ing "too dangerous" an incentive, and the definition chosen
may fall short of that needed to protect patient welfare. While
prohibiting the more serious incentives would lower the risk to
patients, it would not eliminate the risk. Further, the risk to
patient trust may depend as much on the existence of incen-
tives to limit care and the divided loyalties they create as on
86. Alan L. Hillman et al., Safeguarding Quality in Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFF, Supp. 1993, at 110, 114.
87. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans
in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, 59,032.
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their magnitude. Even relatively moderate incentives can cause
patients to question their physicians' commitment to patient
needs. Accordingly, these commentators advocate the elimina-
tion of financial incentives to limit care entirely, on the grounds
that they pose too great a threat to patient welfare and that
alternative measures to contain costs can be utilized.88
There are several problems with this view. First, as to the
argument that the risk to patient trust depends as much on the
existence of incentives as on their magnitude, all compensation
systems reward physicians either for providing too much care,
as with fee-for-service, or for providing too little care, as with
capitation fees or salary. As commentators have noted for de-
cades, the traditional fee-for-service system leads to a good
deal of unnecessary medical care, and such care can be not
only economically injurious to patients but also detrimental to
their health if one of the inherent risks of medical care materi-
alizes.89 Paying physicians on a salaried basis would remove
their incentive to overserve their patients, but it would leave
them with an incentive to underserve them. By seeing fewer
patients, scheduling fewer follow-up visits, and performing
fewer procedures, salaried physicians can free up more time for
alternative activities, such as consulting, research, or leisure,
without losing any income. It simply is not possible to have a
compensation scheme that avoids all incentives for physicians
to provide inappropriate care to their patients. It may be possi-
ble to reduce the magnitude of the conflict of interest between
a physician's personal financial interests and patient welfare,
but there will always be some conflict of interest.
Second, as to the argument that costs can be controlled
without using financial incentives to limit care, while prohibi-
tion of incentives to limit care would limit the risk to patient
welfare, it is not clear that alternative measures to contain
costs are sufficiently effective.90 For example, health care plans
have used educational interventions to modify physician use of
88. See MARK RODWIN. MONEY. MORALS AND ETHICS 232-33 (1994); Wolf, supra
note 43, at 37.
89. For example, some patients who receive unnecessary coronary artery bypass sur-
gery may die during surgery.
90. See Richard H. Egdahl & Cynthia H. Taft, Financial Incentives to Physicians,
315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 59, 59 (1986) (questioning the effectiveness of educational efforts
in changing physician behavior).
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services. These interventions include efforts to improve physi-
cian awareness of the costs of and medical indications for tests,
procedures, and treatments and to provide feedback to the phy-
sicians regarding their expenditures for patient care and the
medical appropriateness of their practices. A number of studies
have demonstrated the effectiveness of educational interven-
tions at reducing the utilization of services."" It also appears
that the interventions can reduce overutilization of medical ser-
vices without increasing underutilization.92 However, the effects
of the interventions often disappear after the interventions have
ended, and the administrative costs of the interventions may be
so high that overall costs savings are small.93
It is not surprising that educational efforts to instill
greater cost consciousness among physicians have shown mixed
results at best.9 4 There is substantial literature on the ineffec-
tiveness of educational efforts in changing physician practices.
This literature primarily deals with efforts to achieve higher
quality care, but its lessons are nevertheless important for ef-
forts to achieve lower cost care. In general, the studies have
shown that simply developing and disseminating educational
guidelines is not sufficient to change physician behavior, even
91. See Donald M. Berwick & Kathryn L. Coltin, Feedback Reduces Test Use in a
Health Maintenance Organization, 255 JAMA 1450, 1453 (1986) (finding that feedback
on the cost of test ordering relative to peers resulted in a 14.2% decline in utilization of
eleven tests); Albert R. Martin et al., A Trial of Two Strategies to Modify the Test-
ordering Behavior of Medical Residents, 303 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1330, 1334 (1980) (find-
ing that chart review resulted in greater reductions in lab testing than did financial incen-
tives for residents); Joel M. Schectman et al., Effect of Education and Feedback on Thy-
roid Function Testing Strategies of Primary Care Clinicians, 151 ARCH. INTERN. MED.
2163, 2165 (1991) (reporting improved compliance with test ordering guidelines after the
circulation of an educational memo); William M. Tierney et al., The Effect on Test Order-
ing of Informing Physicians of the Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Tests, 322 NEw
ENO. J. MEO. 1499, 1503 (1990) (finding that physicians ordered fewer tests when
presented with test charges during the ordering process).
92. Kurt Kroenke et al., Improving House Staff Ordering of Three Common Labo-
ratory Tests: Reductions in Test Ordering Need Not Result in Underutilization, 25 MED.
CARE 928, 935 (1987).
93. Lee Goldman, Changing Physicians' Behavior: The Pot and the Kettle, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1524, 1525 (1990); Steven A. Schroeder et al., The Failure of Physi-
cian Education as a Cost Containment Strategy: Report of a Prospective Controlled Trial
at a University Hospital, 252 JAMA 225, 230 (1984).
94. The following discussion is a revised version of a previously published discussion.
See generally David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physi-
cian Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 598-604 (1994) (discussing the factors underlying
physician resistance to the use of practice guidelines).
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when there is widespread knowledge among physicians about
the guidelines.
The failure of educational efforts is illustrated by the expe-
rience with efforts to reduce the frequency of cesarean sections.
Commentators have observed that physicians perform too many
cesarean sections. Between 1965 and 1986, the cesarean section
rate steadily rose in this country from 4.5 % to about 23 %.95
Even though professional societies in medicine have tried to en-
courage more appropriate use of cesarean sections, the cesarean
section rate has remained high both in the United States and
Canada. 96 For example, after Canada's Society of Obstetri-
cians and Gynaecologists issued practice guidelines that deline-
ated the circumstances that justify a cesarean section, roughly
90% of obstetricians reported that they knew about the guide-
lines, and more than 80 % reported that they agreed with the
guidelines.9 7 Yet, two years after the release of the practice
guidelines, there was only a small decrease in the cesarean sec-
tion rate. Even if that small decline multiplied over time, it
would take more than thirty years for Canada's cesarean sec-
tion rate to reach the medically desirable level.9 8 Similar re-
sults occurred in the U.S. following issuance by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) of a guideline for cesarean sections.
Researchers found that the guideline showed little success in
changing physician behavior.9
The impact of other practice guidelines has been equally
disappointing. In a study of NIH guidelines for the treatment
of breast cancer and coronary artery bypass surgery, research-
ers found little evidence that physicians were incorporating the
guidelines into their practices. 100 Guidelines issued by the
Agency for Health Care Policy Research have fared no better.
In a recent report, the Physician Payment Review Commission
95. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Serv., Rates of Cesarean Delivery-United States, 1991, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 285, 286 (1993).
96. Id. (observing that the cesarean section rate in the United States essentially
stayed the same from 1986 to 1991).
97. Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice?: The Effect of a
Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEw ENG. J MED 1306, 1308
(1989).
98. Id. at 1310.
99. Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consen-
sus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708, 2712 (1987).
100. Id. at 2712.
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observed that physician practices were not being changed by
the guidelines. 0 1
It is not surprising that physicians do not readily incorpo-
rate new guidelines into their practices. People in other profes-
sions act no differently. When sociologists have studied how in-
novations spread from their early proponents to the wider
population, they reach the same conclusion, whether the inno-
vation is in medicine, agriculture, or other contexts. The adop-
tion of an innovation almost never occurs solely from the fact
that potential users know about the innovation and have easy
access to the innovation.10 2
There are a number of reasons why physicians generally
do not respond to educational efforts in the form of practice
guidelines. Some studies have suggested that physicians may
decide how to practice more on the basis of their personal expe-
rience in treating patients than on the recommendations of na-
tional panels of experts. 03 In other words, physicians may be
trusting their limited, anecdotal experience more than scientific
data that have been interpreted in light of the experiences of
many other physicians who are experts in their fields of special-
ization.'04 These studies suggest that physicians are resisting
practice guidelines as an unwarranted intrusion on their deci-
sion-making authority.10 5 There are at least two factors that
may be underlying this resistance. First, American culture has
traditionally valued and encouraged professional autonomy on
the ground that society would benefit greatly if professionals
were free to exercise their creativity.10 6 Second, physicians tend
to distrust the pronouncements of researchers. In one study,
101. Neel, supra note 37, at 13.
102. JAMES C. COLEMAN ET AL.. MEDICAL INNOVATION: A DIFFUSION STUDY 55
(1966).
103. See generally Peter J. Greco & John M. Eisenberg, Changing Physicians' Prac-
tices, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1271, 1271 (1993) (discussing six general methods of chang-
ing physician practice including clinical practice guidelines); Louise Pilote et al., Return to
Work after Uncomplicated Myocardial Infarction: A Trial of Practice Guidelines in the
Community, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 383 (1992) (concluding that reluctance to fol-
low practice guidelines reflected physician concerns with patient prognosis).
104. Practice guidelines are developed by panels of medical experts who consider
studies in the medical literature together with their own experiences in treating patients.
John T. Kelly & James E. Swartwout, Development of Practice Parameters by Physician
Organizations, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 54, 56 (1990).
105. Greco & Eisenberg, supra note 103, at 1272.
106. See BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN. THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 87, 91-92 (1976).
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practicing physicians reported that they viewed researchers as
biased by their personal interest in having their theories vali-
dated and their work published. 0 7 As a result, the practitioners
believed that scientific studies tend to exaggerate the value of a
new test or treatment and that the initial promise of an innova-
tion often does not hold up when the innovation is used more
widely. 08 Since the panels of experts that issue practice guide-
lines tend to include the researchers who have worked on the
problem, distrust of researchers will likely carry over to distrust
of practice guidelines.
Other factors underlying the resistance to change include
personal interests and patient preferences. For example, with
cesarean sections, physicians may continue performing unnec-
essary procedures for both of these reasons. They may believe
that performing a cesarean section is in their interest because it
will reduce their risk of malpractice liability. If a child is born
with an injury, the jury might attribute the injury to the use of
a vaginal delivery even when the injury actually occurred
before labor commenced. Physicians also may be responding to
financial and other personal incentives to perform cesarean sec-
tions-physicians are often paid more for cesarean sections
than vaginal deliveries. In addition, less time is required for a
cesarean section, thereby freeing up more time for other activi-
ties, such as sleeping (when the baby is born at night) or in-
creasing income by seeing other patients. Physicians also may
be responding to patient preferences for cesarean sections over
a painful and prolonged delivery.'0 9
107. Ann L. Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science: The Diffu-
sion of New Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH
CARE 5, 9-10 (1988).
108. See id. This skepticism is hardly unwarranted. It is not difficult to find exam-
ples of new techniques or treatments that did not live up to their initial promise. For exam-
ple, the use of drugs to dilate blood vessels, once widely prescribed for patients to counter-
act senile dementia, has no value for that purpose. Jerry Avorn et al., Scientific Versus
Commercial Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM J
MED. 4, 4 (1982).
109. Lomas et al., supra note 97, at 1310. The failure of practice guidelines to
change behavior cannot be attributed simply to an inability of physicians to modify well-
entrenched practices. There are a number of cases in which the medical profession has
rapidly adapted to medical innovations, even without the issuance of practice guidelines.
For example, within five years of its introduction in the United States, laparoscopic chole-
cystectomy has replaced more traditional surgical methods in roughly 80% of operations to
remove the gall bladder. NIH Consensus Development Panel on Gallstones and
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In some cases, physicians have readily incorporated new
guidelines into their practices. These examples suggest that the
dissemination of practice guidelines must be accompanied by
mandates or financial incentives if they are to be successful. 1 0
When guidelines were developed for anesthesiologists to use
when monitoring patients who are rendered unconscious by
general anesthesia, their implementation resulted from a com-
bination of mandates and financial incentives. Hospitals and a
state licensing board required their use,"" and malpractice in-
surers offered reductions in premiums to anesthesiologists who
use the guidelines.1 2
New York State's experience with coronary artery bypass
surgery provides an important example in which mandates en-
sured adherence to practice guidelines. In a study of coronary
artery bypass surgery in New York, researchers found a very
low rate of inappropriate operations. The authors of the study
attributed the findings to the state government's careful regula-
tion of bypass surgery, including the requirement that hospitals
satisfy high standards of quality before they can be certified or
recertified as centers for open heart surgery.11 3
Reimbursement policies of health care insurers have been
an important example of how financial incentives can speed the
adoption of practice guidelines. Before the American College of
Cardiology and American Heart Association issued guidelines
on cardiac pacemaker implantation,1 4 data suggested that over
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, Gallstones and Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 269
JAMA 1018, 1018 (1993).
110. In several cases, practice guidelines have been adopted by physicians when local
"opinion leaders" (physicians whose opinions tend to be followed by other physicians in
their community) have adopted the guidelines and encouraged their colleagues to do so as
well. Orentlicher, supra note 94, at 602-03. However, opinion leadership is not a complete
answer. There is still the question of what leads opinion leaders to endorse new guidelines.
Opinion leadership is more an explanation of how a change spreads through the medical
profession rather than an explanation of why the change is adopted.
11. John H. Eichhorn, Prevention of Intraoperative Anesthesia Accidents and Re-
lated Severe Injury through Safety Monitoring, 70 ANESTHESIOLOGY 572, 572 (1989). See
also John H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia at
Harvard Medical School, 256 JAMA 1017 (1986) (describing the standards development
process at Harvard).
112. Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., The Development of Anesthesia Guidelines and Stan-
dards, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 61, 63 (1990).
113. Lucian L. Leape et al., The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Artery Bypass
Graft Surgery in New York State, 269 JAMA 753, 859-60 (1993).
114. Comm. on Pacemaker Implantation, American College of Cardiology/Ameri-
can Heart Ass'n Task Force on Assessment of Diagnostic & Therapeutic Cardiovascular
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20% of pacemaker implantations were not warranted. 15 Fol-
lowing the issuance of the guidelines, there was a 28 % decline
in the use of pacemakers in Medicare patients." 6 The decline
probably reflected the use of the pacemaker guidelines by
Medicare in deciding when to reimburse physicians for im-
planting a pacemaker."'
In short, efforts to educate physicians simply through the
issuance of practice guidelines rarely are successful. Physicians
often have countervailing incentives to maintain their existing
practices. Consequently, additional measures, particularly fi-
nancial incentives and/or credible threats or methods of en-
forcement, are needed to make educational efforts work.
3. Balancing Ethical Concerns with Cost Constraints
From the preceding discussion, two important lessons may
be drawn. First, the need to contain health care costs will inevi-
tably require physicians to exercise their own discretion to de-
cide when potentially beneficial diagnostic tests or therapeutic
procedures should be withheld from their patients. While to
some extent decisions about which tests or procedures will be
withheld from which patients can be made by the public, act-
Procedures, Guidelines for Implantation of Cardiac Pacemakers and Antiarrhythmia De-
vices, 18 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1 (1991).
115. Allan M. Greenspan et al., Incidence of Unwarranted Implantation of Perma-
nent Cardiac Pacemakers in a Large Medical Population, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 158,
160 (1988).
116. Janet B. Mitchell et al., The Medicare Physician Fee Freeze, HEALTH AFF,
Spring 1989, at 21, 27.
117. Kelly & Swartwout, supra note 104, at 54. An interesting question is why reim-
bursement has not been based more frequently on physician adherence to practice guide-
lines. Most likely, this is because most practice guidelines have been developed relatively
recently and are available for only a small percentage of medical decisions. As indicated
earlier, there also is a good deal of resistance by the medical profession to the imposition of
practice guidelines. When Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois disclosed its plan to re-
quire physicians to follow practice guidelines, the American Medical Association criticized
the plan as an unwarranted intrusion by an insurance company on professional judgment.
Michael L. Millenson, Blue Cross to Enforce Treatment Guidelines, CHI. TRM., November
10, 1993, at Al. Health care insurers may not be using their reimbursement policies to
impose practice guidelines in the belief that the benefits of using practice guidelines are not
worth the costs of antagonizing physicians. In addition, it would be more difficult to use
reimbursement policies when insurance plans compensate physicians through capitation or
salary. Under fee-for-service, it is relatively simple for an insurer to refuse reimbursement
when the physician submits a bill for an unjustified service. However, with salaries or capi-
tation fees, insurers need to develop methods for detecting unnecessary tests or procedures
and formulas for deciding how much to dock a physician for each unnecessary test or
procedure.
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ing through their government or their private health care plans,
in many cases, society will have to rely on physician discretion.
This is so for two reasons: developing rationing guidelines takes
a good deal of time and money, and it simply is not possible to
create guidelines for every medical decision that might arise.
Although placing physicians in the role of rationers of health
care divides their duty of loyalty to their patients, it is not pos-
sible to avoid dividing the loyalty. Accordingly, physicians will
have to become more cost-conscious in their decision making.,,1
The second lesson drawn from the preceding discussion is
that if society wishes to change physician behavior so that phy-
sicians become more cost-conscious in their decision making, it
must employ mandates or financial incentives. Education alone
does not work.119
These two lessons suggest that society should consider two
important measures in its efforts to control health care costs.
One of the measures is a personal financial incentive. The other
is an external mandate. First, as already discussed, health care
insurers can tie the compensation of physicians to the physi-
cians' success in containing health care costs. Physicians be-
come more cost-conscious because every decision would have
an impact on their income. The risk to patient welfare can be
cabined by prohibiting financial incentives that carry a signifi-
cant risk of abuse.12 0
118. In theory, we also could make patients more cost-conscious. Patients should be
able to receive whatever care they are willing to pay for. While relying on consumer choice
can help contain costs, it is not a complete answer for the same reason that we cannot
completely eliminate physician discretion in making rationing decisions. Under any kind of
health care insurance plan, patients will receive a certain package of guaranteed benefits
for their premium payments. It is possible to charge a smaller premium for fewer benefits,
but ultimately it is not possible to specify with precision what benefits will be included in
the insurance plan. Indeed, all insurance plans, whether traditional Blue Cross fee-for-
service plans or HMOs, and virtually all legislative proposals for reform include a concept
of a basic benefits plan that covers all medically necessary hospital and physician services.
Yet, just as society cannot give detailed guidance to physicians about what will or will not
be covered, health care plans cannot give detailed information to patients about what will
or will not fall within the definition of medically necessary care.
119. Any personal incentive would do the trick, whether it takes the form of a finan-
cial interest or some non-financial gain. For example, academic physicians are motivated,
in part, by personal recognition for their research discoveries or personal prestige for their
academic titles. However, it is hard to see how physicians could be motivated to incorpo-
rate cost considerations in their decision making with non-financial, personal incentives.
120. Incentives that should be prohibited include incentives that place more than a
small percentage of a physician's income at risk, that are calculated on the basis of the
costs for the individual physician's patients or for only a small group of physicians' pa-
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Second, health care plans could impose a fixed budget for
health care costs and require physicians to operate within the
budget. Physicians would become more cost-conscious because
any resources used on one day would mean fewer resources for
care in the future. This second approach is essentially the ap-
proach used in Great Britain where physicians are given a fixed
budget that reflects much lower per capita health care expendi-
tures than in the U.S. The physicians in Great Britain have
adapted to a different, less costly standard of care than their
U.S. counterparts. Indeed, in most cases, physicians in Great
Britain appear to believe that they are providing a medically
appropriate standard of care and that U.S. physicians provide a
good deal of wasteful and unnecessary care.'21
4. Deciding Between Fixed Budgets and Personal Financial
Incentives for Physicians
From an ethical standpoint, the fixed budget approach is
preferable. Although it forces physicians to balance the needs
of each patient against those of other patients, it does not cre-
ate an additional conflict between patient needs and the physi-
cians' personal interests. In other words, physicians have a dual
loyalty, but not the triple loyalty that exists with financial in-
centives to limit care.
Fixed budgets have other important benefits. They force
society to confront directly the fact that there are competing
demands for its resources and that hard choices have to be
made among those demands. The public is better served by an
open process for deciding how many resources will be devoted
to health care and how many to other social services.
Fixed budgets also assure physicians that, if they conserve
resources when treating one patient, more resources will be
available for other, more deserving patients. Conversely, if phy-
sicians do not conserve resources, fewer resources will be avail-
able for later, more deserving patients. Currently, many com-
mentators argue that because there is no guarantee that
resources saved on one patient will be available for other pa-
tients, or that are calculated more frequently than once a year. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 80-84.
121. HENRY A. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ. THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RA-
TIONING HEALTH CARE 66 (1984).
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tients or that spending resources on one patient will deplete the
resources available for other patients, physicians must not with-
hold potentially beneficial care from one patient on the ground
that the saved resources would be better used elsewhere. 11 2 If
we adopt a closed system with a fixed budget, it is inevitable
that treating one patient will affect the resources available for
other patients.
The primary objection to fixed budgets is thai they are po-
litically difficult to achieve. Medicare and Medicaid costs have
far exceeded the levels projected when they were first enacted.
Further, in the recent health care reform debate, the idea of
budget caps did not survive very long. In Oregon, where the
legislature has adopted a fixed budget, the funding level was so
generous that little cost savings were realized.23 While fixed
budgets arouse fierce political opposition, personal financial in-
centives for physicians are readily accepted politically and are
already widespread.
CONCLUSION
Whether the result of legislation or private initiative,
health care reform would pose serious threats to the patient-
physician relationship. With its emphasis on managed care ar-
rangements that link the patient's choice of insurer with the
patient's choice of physicians, reform would increase the likeli-
hood of discontinuities in patient care. With its greater respon-
sibility for physicians to make individual rationing decisions,
reform would also increasingly divide the loyalty of physicians
to their patients.
There is no ideal solution to these problems. Linking the
patients' choice of insurance to their choice of physicians is an
important measure for containing health care costs. Similarly,
while hard rationing decisions are also necessary if health care
costs are to be contained, there is no way to remove all of those
decisions from physicians.
Despite the lack of an ideal solution, the harmful effects of
reform can be mitigated. If health care plans include an option
122. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States Is
So Hard: Cost Containment, Justice, and Provider Autonomy, 314 Naw ENG. J. MED.
1380, 1382 (1986).
123. Janofsky, supra note 33, at 6.
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for patients to use physicians outside of their plan at a higher
cost, then there would not be as much disruption of patient-
physician relationships.' 24 In addition, if fixed budgets rather
than financial incentives were used to ensure that physicians
limit their use of health care resources, then rationing decisions
would be influenced much less by the physicians' personal fi-
nancial interests.
124. Even this solution is problematic, for it is an option that would not be available
to the indigent unless government subsidies to purchase insurance included funds to pay the
extra costs.
[Vol. 5:141
